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Abstract
The important role of friends, neighbors and colleagues in shaping individual
choices has been brought out in a number of studies over the years. The pres-
ence of significant ‘local’ influence in shaping individual behavior suggests that
firms, governments and developmental agencies should explicitly incorporate it
in the design of their marketing and developmental strategies. This paper de-
velops a framework for the study of optimal strategies in the presence of social
interaction.
We focus on the case of a single player who exerts costly effort to get a set of
individuals – engaged in social interaction – to choose a certain action. Our
formulation allows for different types of social interaction and also allows for
the player to have incomplete information concerning the connections among
individuals.
We first show that incorporating information on social interaction can have
large effects on the profits of a player. Then, we establish that an increase
in the level and dispersion of social interaction can raise or lower the optimal
strategy and profits of the player, depending on the content of the interaction.
Finally, we study the value of social network information for the player and find
that it depends on the dispersion in social connections. The economic interest
of these results is illustrated via a discussion of two economic applications:
advertising in the presence of word of mouth communication and seeding a
network.
Keywords: Social interaction, seeding the network, word of mouth com-
munication, diffusion strategy.
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1 Introduction
In making their choices individuals use personally gathered information along with the
information they get from their acquaintances. The important role of friends, neigh-
bors and colleagues in shaping individual choices has been brought out in a number
of studies over the years.1 The presence of significant ‘local’ influence in shaping indi-
vidual behavior suggests that firms, governments and developmental agencies should
explicitly incorporate local network effects into their marketing strategy.
Indeed, the popularity of the expression word of mouth communication reflects the
fact that both academics as well as practitioners are aware of the potential importance
of local influence. The use of social networks in commercial marketing is increasingly
popular and has given rise to the term viral marketing : a marketing strategy which
takes advantages of existing networks of influence among consumers to generate a
large product demand with limited advertising resources.2 Similarly, governmental
and developmental agencies has coined the expression peer-leading interventions to
describe social programmes which attempt to reduce risky behavior by exploiting the
presence of network effects.3
Local social influence is, however, a nebulous concept and it has been resistant to
formal treatment. Two difficulties are worth noting. The first difficulty is a conceptual
one. Networks of social relationships overlap in complicated ways and have a number
of different dimensions. The need is for a way to define patterns of relationships that
is simple and also general enough that it captures key intuitions we have about flows
of influence. The second difficulty is a practical one. Firms and other players who
are trying to get individuals to choose certain actions usually do not know a great
1For example, Coleman (1966) presents evidence on how a doctor’s prescription of new drugs
was influenced by his location in communication networks. Conley and Udry (2004) and Foster and
Rosenzweig (1995) present evidence that farmers are influenced by their neighbors in the choice of
crops and agricultural inputs. In the context of brand and product choice, Feick and Price (1987),
Reingen et al. (1984), Godes and Mayzlin (2004) present evidence for word of mouth communication.
2The advent of new communication tools such as email, chat rooms, web sites, allow consumers
to talk with others essentially at no costs. This has led marketers to re-evalute the impact of
network-based marketing strategy as an effective way to market products. Perhaps the best known
case of viral marketing is the rapid adoption of HOTMAIL: almost 12 million people signed up with
Hotmail within eighteen months of its start, and the firm spent around 50,000 dollars in advertising
the product. For a discussion on the empirical importance of viral marketing see Leskovec, Adamic
and Huberman (2006) and Godes and Mayzlin (2004). See also Rosen (2000) for a variety of
case studies in which commercial organizations target key individuals in social contexts to generate
desirable outcomes.
3Organizations often incorporate peer effects in designing policies to promote behavior change,
such as reducing smoking and reducing risk behavior that can lead to sexually transmitted diseases.
See Rogers (2003) and Rosen (2000) for an illustration of different case studies. See Valente et
al. (2003) and Kelly et al. (1991) for a discussion about the empirical importance of peer-leading
interventions.
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deal about the actual structures. Thus, we need a way to think about the design
of marketing or development strategies in a context of incomplete information about
ties that connect individuals.
This paper proposes a general framework which addresses these difficulties, and
thereby opens up the study of optimal strategies in contexts characterized by ‘lo-
cal’ influence. There are two groups of players, M and N . Every member of group
M chooses a strategy with a view to influencing members of group N to choose
certain actions. The actions taken by members of group M lead to some informa-
tion/resources reaching individuals in N . This information is shared by individuals
in N ‘locally’. This local sharing leads to a new distribution of resources or infor-
mation. Group N members make decisions based on this distribution, which in turn
generates payoffs for members in group M. In the present paper we will study the
case in which there is only one player in group M. In a companion paper Galeotti
and Goyal (2007), we study the general case with |M| ≥ 1.
Two aspects of social interaction are important in our study. The first aspect is the
level of social interaction. Do individuals have many friends or few friends, and is the
distribution of friends even or is it characterized by inequality with some individuals
having many friends while others have only a few? We will model levels of social
interaction via the distribution of connections that individuals have. The number of
connections of an individual will be termed her degree and we will study the effects
of the degree distribution on optimal strategy and profits. The degree distribution
summarizes a large amount of information about the network in a very simple and
natural way. It also allows to formalize ideas about adding links or redistributing
links in the network. The notion of adding links to a network is studied in terms
of first order stochastic dominance relations, while the idea of redistributing links is
formalized in terms of second order stochastic dominance relations.4
The second aspect is the content of social interaction. Inter-personal interaction is
important due to two types of factors: information sharing and adoption externalities.
Information sharing about prices and quality of products is important in shaping
demand for them. In the case of products such as fax machines, softwares and e-mail,
the rewards to an individual depend on how many others adopt the product. Our
model allows for both these types of interaction.
The analysis examine two set of questions. We first address how the content of
interaction and the distribution of connections jointly shape the optimal strategy of
4Many processes governing network formation exhibit stochastic dominance relationships as pa-
rameters describing the underlying process are altered. For example, in Jackson and Rogers (2006)
links between nodes occur both at a random base and at a network base (local network search). The
authors show that by changing the random-network ratio the resulting degree distributions can be
ordered in the sense of stochastic dominance. Furthermore, for different networks, these parameters
can be easily estimated.
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player M and the level of surpluses that she can hope to earn. We then study how
a monopolist incorporates additional information on the network in the design of
marketing strategies and its effect on profits.
Our analysis brings out three general points. First, we show that incorporating
information on social interaction can have large effects on the profits of a player M.
Thus it is important for firms and governments to take social interaction seriously.
Second, we show that an increase in the level and dispersion of social interaction can
increase or decrease the strategy and profits of player M; the effect depends on the
content of the interaction. Therefore players like firms and governments should pay
attention to the type of interaction as well as the level of social interaction in designing
their strategies. Third, we show that the dispersion of connections determines the
value of additional information on connections. This means that player M should
be willing to pay more for details of network information in contexts with greater
dispersion in social connections.
The economic interest of these findings is illustrated via a detailed analysis of two
prominent economic applications: advertising in the presence of word of mouth com-
munication and product introduction in the presence of adoption externalities. In
the information sharing example, there is a firm advertising to a group of consumers,
who share product information among themselves.5 Potential buyers are not aware of
the existence of the product and the firm undertakes costly informative advertising.
Consumers share the information they receive from the firm with their friends and
neighbors.
In the adoption externalities example, we study how a firm can optimally induce the
adoption of a new product in a context with local interaction.6 Suppose individuals
buy the product only if all their social contacts have already adopted the product.
There are two periods, 1 and 2. In period 1 no individual will buy the product and
to generate demand in period 2, the firm must seed the network: distribute some free
samples of the product in period 1.7
We illustrate one set of implications of our general results: profits are increasing
in level but decreasing in the dispersion of social interaction in the word of mouth
communication application. The opposite pattern obtains in the model with adoption
externalities. Profits are decreasing in the level and increasing in the dispersion of
social interaction! Thus the content of interaction plays a key role in mediating the
5This example combines the formulation of advertising from Butters (1977) with the word of
mouth communication formulation from Ellison and Fudenberg (1995).
6This example is based on the threshold model which has been studied in a variety of fields ranging
from economics, sociology, epidemiology and statistical physics. See, e.g., Granovetter (1978), Lopez-
Pintado (2007), Jackson and Yariv (2007) and, Pastor-Satorras and Vespigniani (2001).
7Active seeding strategies are widely used in practice. For a discussion of a number of case studies
see Rosen (2000).
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relation between social interaction and payoffs. Similarly, contrasting implications
also arise with regard to the effects of social interaction on optimal strategy.
We now place our paper in perspective. There is a large literature on optimal firm
strategies with regard to advertising and the adoption of goods with adoption exter-
nalities.8 Similarly there is a large literature on local interaction both with regard to
word of mouth communication and with regard to adoption in the presence of local
externalities.9 An important contribution of our paper is a simple model in which
interaction can involve local information sharing or local adoption externalities and
firms incorporate the local interaction explicitly in their choice of optimal influence
strategies.10 Our paper thus bridges these two literatures. The analysis shows that
this model is tractable and that it yields a number of insights into how the content
and level of social interaction jointly shape optimal strategies and profits.
Our paper is related to two recent papers which study optimal strategies in the face
of local interaction, Ballester et al. (2006) and Banerji and Dutta (2006). Ballester
et al. (2006) study a model in which individuals located in a network choose actions
(criminal activities) which affect the payoffs of other individuals within the network.
They examine the question: which individuals should be eliminated from the network
if the objective is to minimize crime? This problem is related to the issue of targeting
which we study. Banerji and Dutta (2006) study a setting where firms sell to con-
sumers located on a network and there are local adoption externalities. Their interest
is in characterizing networks which can sustain different technologies in equilibrium.
Ballester et al (2006) and Banerji and Dutta (2006) both assume that the network is
common knowledge among the players. By contrast, we study a model in which the
network is imperfectly known and we are then led to a study of networks in terms of
degree distributions, something which is quite distinct from these two papers.
Section 2 presents a basic model of strategic diffusion. Section 3 develops the main
ideas of our paper via a detailed discussion of the information sharing example; in
section 3.1 we analyze the general model. Section 4 presents two extensions which
allow for targeted strategies and the presence of opinion leaders. Section 5 concludes.
A number of extensions are proposed in the appendix. These extensions show that our
method of analysis can be easily extended to accommodate a variety of phenomena.
8For early work on advertising see Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984). For early
work on firms in markets with adoption externalities, see Farrell and Saloner (1986), Rolfs (1974),
and Katz and Shapiro (1986); for a recent survey, see Shy (2001).
9For local learning and word of mouth communication, see Bala and Goyal (1998), Ellison and
Fudenberg (1993,1995); for a survey of this work see Goyal (2005). For local interaction and adoption
externalities see Ellison (2003), Morris (2000), Jackson and Yariv (2007), Sundararajan (2006),
Lopez-Pintado (2007). For a general treatment of games with local externalities, see Galeotti et. al.
(2006).
10As we have mentioned in the introduction above the companion paper Galeotti and Goyal (2006)
studies the case of competition among firms.
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2 Basic Model
We study the problem of a player M who exerts costly effort with a view to get-
ting a group of individuals to choose an action. Individual behavior is influenced
by social interaction. There are two dimensions of social interaction which will be
relevant in our paper. The first dimension concerns the content of the interaction.
Broadly speaking social interaction may involve sharing of valuable information and
adoption externalities. Our model accommodates both these aspects; see example
2.1-2.2 below. The second dimension is about who meets whom, i.e., the distribution
of personal connections. The analysis will examine how these two dimensions, the
content of interaction and the distribution of connections, shape the optimal strategy
of player M and the level of surpluses that she can hope to earn. We now get into
the details of the model.11
There is a unit measure of individuals N = [0, 1]. Individuals are located in a social
network and in principle the structure of the network can be complex and take on
a variety of forms. However, M has limited knowledge about this network. We will
model the beliefs of M about this network as follows: she knows the proportions
of individuals having different levels of social interaction. We now elaborate on this
formulation.
For an individual i ∈ N , the level of social interaction is parameterized by a number
k, where k is termed the degree. We will suppose that each individual draws k others
with probability P (k) ≥ 0, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., k¯} = O and ∑k∈O P (k) = 1. She uses an
(atomless) uniform distribution on the unit interval to pick her sample. So, if she has
a k sized sample, she makes k draws, and each draw is independent.12 Now suppose
that the draw of the sample size is independent across individuals. We can then say
that there is fraction P (k) of individuals who choose a k sized sample.13 We will refer
to P as the degree distribution. Define kˆ =
∑
k∈O P (k)k as the average degree of
social interaction.
As a benchmark case, we will suppose that M knows P and chooses an action x ∈
[0, 1].14 Let the profits from an individual influenced by k others be given by φk(x),
where φk(·) : [0, 1] → R; assume that φk(·) is twice continuously differentiable, for
every k ∈ O. The expected net payoffs to player M under P and effort x are:
11It is important to emphasize that heterogeneity in the level of social interaction across individuals
has a very different effect on individual behavior and on optimal strategies of the external player
as compared to individual heterogeneity with regard to willingness to play; see the appendix for a
detailed discussion on this point.
12The probability of drawing the same person two or more times is zero, given that there is a
continuum of individuals.
13Note that we are invoking a variant of the law of large numbers here.
14In section 4.1 we relax this assumption and we allow playerM to know more about the pattern
of personal connections.
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Π(x|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)φk(x)− C(α, x), (1)
where C(α, ·) : [0, 1]→ R is the cost of effort and the parameter α ≥ 0 indicates the
efficiency in generating efforts.
We now make a number of remarks on the scope of this framework. First we discuss
the continuum of individuals formulation. The continuum formulation allows us to
move from the distribution of sample sizes at the individual level to the fraction
of individuals with a certain degree easily. It also simplifies the exposition of the
arguments in some places. Second we note that the atomless uniform distribution
assumption is convenient, but the framework allows for a non-uniform draw of samples
as well. Indeed, section 4.2 extends the model to allow for heterogeneities in the
probability of being drawn. It is also worth noting an implication of the atomless
distribution: the probability of two individuals picking a common partner is zero.
In other words, it rules out any clustering in the network. Thus, in our framework,
we would need probability distributions with atoms if we want to study clustering.
Third, we have written the payoffs in terms of individual degree, but the framework
allows for indirect social interaction effects: for instance, it is easy to accommodate
indirect flow of information from i to j to k (on this issue also see the discussion in
word of mouth application below).
We are now ready to introduce our two leading economic examples.
Example 2.1 Word of mouth communication
Consider a firm advertising to a group of consumers, who share product information
among themselves. The model here combines the formulation of advertising from
Butters (1977) with the word of mouth communication formulation from Ellison and
Fudenberg (1995).15 Player M is a monopolist selling a good at price 1; the cost of
producing the good is zero. The set of buyers is N = [0, 1]; each buyer has inelastic
demand and her reservation value for the object is v = 1. Suppose first that potential
buyers are not aware of the existence of the product and the monopolist undertakes
costly informative advertising.
The monopolist chooses x ∈ [0, 1]; this is the fraction of individuals in N who receive
advertisements. Let the cost of effort x be αx2/2, where α > 0. A buyer buys either
if she receives the advertisement from the monopolist or if she receives information
via word of mouth communication from her cohort. In this example, a buyer with
degree k contacts k other consumers, from whom she obtains information about the
15For recent empirical work on the importance of word of mouth communication in the diffusion
of products, see Mobius, Niehaus and Rosenblat (2006) and Godes and Mayzlin (2004)
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product, if any. It then follows that if the monopolist chooses x, her expected profits
from a k degree buyer are:
φk(x) = 1− (1− x)k+1. (2)
This is the probability that a consumer with k friends becomes aware of the product.
For a given distribution, P , we can write the expected profits under strategy x as:
Π(x|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)[1− (1− x)k+1]− α
2
x2.
We would like to emphasize three aspects of this example. First, note that we are
assuming that individuals obtain information only from their direct neighbors. This
assumption is valid when advertisement is about information which is only valuable
for a short length of time, such as discounts, sales and last-minute offers. However,
when advertisement is about information which is more stable, it is appropriate to
allow for indirect information transmission across neighbor or neighbors’ neighbor
etc. In the appendix we show that our framework and the methods of analysis can
be extended in a natural way to cover richer patters of information diffusion. Second,
in this example the function of word of mouth communication is to create product
awareness among consumers. The case where consumers are aware of the product
but do not know the quality of the product can be modeled similarly, and leads to
very similar payoffs and incentives for the firm. This formulation is developed in
detail in the appendix. Finally, in the appendix we extend this example to allow for
competition between firms. This extension shows that most of the results obtained
in the single firm case extends to an oligopoly advertising model. 
Example 2.2 Seeding the network16
In some interesting contexts, the returns from adopting a product depend on whether
others do likewise. Well known examples of products which display adoption exter-
nalities include fax machines, software programmes, telephones and e-mail accounts.
This example considers the case of a new product and asks how a firm can optimally
induce its adoption in a context with local interaction. The model introduces optimal
marketing strategies in a standard threshold model.17
Suppose individuals use the following simple decision rule. If a consumer with degree
k observes that s of her social contacts have already the product then she buys the
object with probability ψ(k, s). Hence, ψ(k, s) indicates the probability of adoption
of a k-degree consumer in the event that s of her neighbors have the product. We
16This example is inspired by discussions with Arun Sundararajan. We thank him for his com-
ments.
17See footnote 6 for detailed references on previous existing work on the threshold model in
economics, sociology and statistical physic.
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assume that a consumer adopts the product only if at least one of her neighbors has
the product, i.e., ψ(k, 0) = 0 for all k ∈ O.
Suppose there are two periods, 1 and 2. Under our assumptions, in period 1 no
individual will buy the product. To generate demand in period 2, the firm can seed
the network: it can distribute some free samples of the product in period 1. Let
x ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of individuals who are sent free samples and let the price of
the object be 1. The expected returns to the monopolist from a k degree individual
are then given by:
φk(x) = (1− x)
k∑
s=1
(
k
s
)
xs(1− x)k−sψ(k, s).
This is simply the probability that a k degree consumer does not receive the product
for free and that she will adopt the object. Clearly, the behavior of the function
φk(·) ultimately depends on the assumptions of ψ(k, s).18 For simplicity, here we
focus on the case in which for all k ∈ O, ψ(k, s) = 1 if s = k, otherwise it is zero.
That is, consumers adopt the product if all their social contacts have already adopted
the product.19 In this case, the expected returns to the monopolist from a k degree
individual are then given by:
φk(x) = (1− x)xk.
It can be checked that φk(x) is increasing and convex for low x, and decreasing and
concave for large x, and that it is decreasing and convex in k. The expected profits
to a monopolist who chooses x are:
Π(x|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)(1− x)xk.
The direct cost of production and dissemination of samples is zero, but a free sample
has an implicit cost for the monopolist since a consumer who gets a free product does
not buy at a positive price later. It is easy to see that expected profits at x = 0 and
at x = 1 equal 0. Further, the expected profits are positive for every x ∈ (0, 1). 
The examples illustrate how different aspects of social interaction can be accommo-
dated within our framework. We now introduce a few concepts which help us in
studying changes in the levels of social interaction.
18In the appendix we show that our methods of analysis can accommodate a variety of different
processes of adoption, i.e., different functional forms of ψ(k, s).
19This decision rule is reasonable if there is a status quo technology which everyone uses and a
switch to a new technology is justified only if communication with the new technology is possible
with everyone. Consider a school which sends messages to parents via post, and is considering
switching to e-mail. It will switch to e-mail only if every parent can be reached via e-mail. We also
emphasize that our findings can be generalized to a situation in which individuals adopt the product
if a sufficiently large fraction of their neighbors adopt the new technology.
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An increase in the level of social interaction is modeled in terms of first order stochas-
tic shifts in the degree distribution (FOSD). We are also interested in the role of the
dispersion of social interaction. Changes in dispersion are studied in terms of second
order stochastic shifts in the degree distribution. When studying increasing disper-
sion, we will focus on mean preserving spreads of distributions (MPS). While these
concepts are standard, we present them here for easy reference. In what follows, P
and P ′ are distinct degree distributions defined on O. Given a degree distribution P ,
let the cumulative distribution function be denoted by P : {1, 2, ..., k¯} → [0, 1] i.e.
P(y) =
y∑
k=1
P (k).
Definition 2.1 P ′ first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) P if and only if P ′(k) ≤
P(k) for every k ∈ {1, 2, .., k¯}.
Definition 2.2 P ′ is a mean preserving spread of P if and only if P and P ′ have the
same mean and
y∑
k=1
P(k) ≤
y∑
k=1
P ′(k),
for every y ∈ {1, 2, ...k¯}.
This completes the description of the model we now turn to a study of the effects of
the content of interaction, which is captured by the function φ, and the distribution
of connections P , on the optimal strategy, x∗, and profits, Π(x∗|P ).
3 Optimal advertising with word of mouth com-
munication
In this section we develop some of the main ideas of our paper via a detailed discus-
sion of optimal advertising in the presence of word of mouth communication among
consumers.
We start with a preliminary enquiry into the potential advantages of using word of
mouth communication. Perhaps the simplest way to do this is to compare the profits
under a strategy which ignores word of mouth communication with profits under a
strategy that optimally responds to word of mouth distribution. To fix ideas suppose
that α = 1 and that everyone draws the same sample size k. Then the optimal
strategy of a firm which ignores word of mouth advertising is to set x = 1. The
profits under this strategy are Π(1) = 1/2. On the other hand, the optimal strategy
of a firm which incorporates the word of mouth communication is given by x∗k, where
x∗k solves:
(k + 1)(1− x∗)k − x∗ = 0.
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We can substitute this strategy in the profits to get the profits under optimal strat-
egy. Denote this profit by Π(x∗k). Figure 1 plots the percentage advantages, i.e.,
[Π(x∗k)−Π(1)]/Π(1), from incorporating word of mouth communication in the design
of advertising strategy. The figure shows that if k ≥ 10 then optimally responding to
word of mouth communication can lead to a 80% increase in profits!
Having established that a firm can make substantial gains in profits by incorporating
word of mouth communication in its marketing strategy, we now examine the ways
in which optimal strategy and profits vary with the level and dispersion in word of
mouth communication.
We start with the effects of an increase in word of mouth communication. As indi-
viduals talk to more people two forces are at work. On the one hand, a potential
buyer with more connections is more likely to hear about the product from neigh-
bors. In this sense, advertising and word of mouth communication may be viewed as
substitutes. On the other hand, a higher degree of social communication means that
for any advertisement there are now more people who hear about it through word
of mouth communication. In this sense social communication and advertising are
complements. The effects of an increase in the level of word of mouth communication
will therefore depend on which of these two effects will prevail.
If advertising technology is inefficient (i.e., α is large), then optimal x is small and few
consumers receive advertisements. Consequently it is unlikely that a person will hear
about it from others even if she has more contacts. This suggests that the second
positive effect dominates. In contrast, when the advertising technology is efficient
(i.e., α is low), the monopolist chooses high x. Since many consumers hear directly
about the product, an increase in word of mouth makes it much more likely that an
uninformed buyer will hear about the product via word of mouth and this lowers the
incentives for the firm to advertise. The following result summarizes these ideas.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that P ′ FOSD P . There exist αP and α¯P , with 0 < αP ≤
α¯P , such that if α < αP then x
∗
P ≥ x∗P ′, while if α > α¯P then x∗P ≤ x∗P ′.
Proof: The derivative of the marginal returns with respect to degree k at x∗P is:
∂2φk(x
∗
P )
∂x∂k
= (1− x∗P )k [1 + (k + 1) ln(1− x∗P )] .
For sufficiently low x∗P the marginal returns are increasing in k, while for sufficiently
high x∗P the converse holds. Next, note that at the optimum the following holds
∂Π(x∗P |P )
∂x
=
∑
k∈O
P (k)(k + 1)(1− x∗P )k − αx∗P = 0,
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and it is easy to see that x∗P is decreasing in α and that x
∗
P → 0 when α→∞, while
x∗P → 1 when α → 0. The proof is completed by noting that P ′ FOSD P and that
Π(x|P ) is concave in x. 
The effects of greater word of mouth communication on firm’s profits are straightfor-
ward. Suppose the firm keeps the advertisement constant. Then the costs remain the
same, but an increase in word of mouth communication means that more potential
buyers will hear about the product and so revenue will increase. Clearly this will
also hold when the firm reacts optimally to the new word of mouth communication
regime. The following result summarizes this argument.
Proposition 3.2 Firm’s profits are increasing with the level of word of mouth com-
munication.
Proof: Start with some x∗P ∈ (0, 1). Then,
Π(x∗P |P ) ≤ Π(x∗P |P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P ′|P ′),
where the first inequality follows because φk(·) is increasing in k and P ′ FOSD P ,
while the second inequality follows from the optimality of x∗P ′ , under P
′. 
We now turn to the effects of greater dispersion in word of mouth communication.
The simplest way to study this is to consider the case of a mean preserving spread
in word of mouth communication. The optimal response depends on whether the
marginal returns to advertisements are concave or convex in the degrees. If they
are concave then greater dispersion implies a fall in expected marginal returns and
under the concavity of returns with respect to advertisement this means that optimal
advertisement goes down. The converse holds if the marginal returns are convex in
degrees. The following result summarizes these ideas.
Proposition 3.3 Given a P , there exists α˜P and ˜˜αP , with 0 < α˜P ≤ ˜˜αP , such that
if α < α˜P then marginal returns are convex in k, while if α > ˜˜αP then marginal
returns are concave in k. Consequently, optimal efforts increase (decline) with mean
preserving spread of word of mouth communication if α < α˜P and decline if α > ˜˜αP .
Proof: We can write the second derivative of the marginal returns with respect to k
at the optimal strategy x∗P as follows:
∂3φk(x
∗
P )
∂x∂k2
= (1− x∗P )k ln(1− x) [2 + (k + 1) ln(1− x∗P )]
For sufficiently low x∗P this expression is negative while for sufficiently high x
∗
P it is
positive. This means that marginal returns are concave in k for small x∗P and convex
in k for large x∗P . The proof now follows from the observation that x
∗
P is decreasing
in α, and that x∗P → 0 when α→ kˆ + 1, while x∗P → 1 when α→ 0. 
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Finally, we study the effects of greater dispersion in word of mouth communication
on firm’s profits. Here the intuition is quite simple: the value of sampling others is
increasing but concave in the size of the sample. Consequently, greater dispersion has
the effect of lowering the potential for profits. The following result summarizes this
intuition.
Proposition 3.4 Firm profits are falling with greater dispersion in word of mouth
communication.
Proof : Suppose that P ′ is a mean preserving spread of P . Note that,
Π(x∗P ′|P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P ′|P ) ≤ Π(x∗P |P )
where the first inequality follows because φk(·) is concave in k and P ′ is a mean
preserving spread of P , while the second inequality follows by optimality of x∗P , under
P . 
3.1 General results in the basic model
The analysis of the word of mouth communication example yields a number of inter-
esting results on how optimal strategy and profits depend on word of mouth commu-
nication. We now use the intuitions gained to develop general results on how social
interaction affects optimal strategies. The relevance of these results is to highlight the
important point that the effects of increasing social interaction or greater dispersion
in social interaction on optimal strategy depend very much on the content of the in-
teraction. In particular, we will show that the effects of social interaction on optimal
strategies and profits are very different in the seeding the network application.
We start by formally stating the key properties of the returns function φk(·) and the
cost function C(α, x):
Concavity of returns in effort :∀x ∈ [0, 1], ∀k ∈ O, ∂
2φk(x)
∂x2
≤ 0 (R.1)
∀x ∈ (0, 1],∀α > 0, ∂C(α, x)
∂α
> 0;
∂C(α, x)
∂x
> 0;
∂2C(α, x)
∂x2
> 0. (C.1)
Denote the optimal strategy under a degree distribution P by x∗P . Throughout this
section, we will assume that for any P , there exists an interior optimal strategy
x∗P ∈ (0, 1). It is worth noting that in the word of mouth communication model and
in the seeding the network model, the optimal strategy is always interior.
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Recall that we measure an increase in social interaction in terms of a first order
stochastic shift in the distribution P . The following result shows that the effects of
increasing social interaction depend on whether the function φ displays increasing
or decreasing marginal returns with respect to degree. It is useful to define these
properties of φk(·) formally.
Definition 3.1 The function φ exhibits increasing marginal returns in degree (IMRD)
if for all x > x′ and k < k¯: φk+1(x) − φk+1(x′) ≥ φk(x) − φk(x′). Analogously, the
function φ exhibits decreasing marginal returns in degree (DMRD) if for all x > x
′
and k < k¯: φk+1(x)− φk+1(x′) ≤ φk(x)− φk(x′).
Denote the optimal strategy under P and P ′ by x∗P and x
∗
P ′ , respectively. We can
now state our first result on effects of social interaction.
Proposition 3.5 Suppose the payoffs are given by (1) and satisfy (R.1) and (C.1).
Let P ′ FOSD P . If φ satisfies IMRD (DMRD), then x∗P ′ ≥ x∗P (x∗P ′ ≤ x∗P ).
Proof: Suppose x∗P ∈ (0, 1). Then,
∂Π(x∗P |P )
∂x
=
∑
k∈O
P (k)
∂φk(x
∗
P )
∂x
− ∂C(α, x
∗
P )
∂x
= 0. (3)
Since P ′ FOSD P and IMRD holds, it follows that ∂Π(x
∗
P |P ′)
∂x
≥ 0. Now (R.1) and
(C.1) together imply that the expected returns function is strictly concave in x for
x ∈ (0, 1], and so x∗P ′ ≥ x∗P . The proof for the DMRD case is analogous and omitted.

Remark 1: It is easy to see that this result can be strengthened and holds so long
as IMRD (DMRD) holds at the optimum x∗P .
Recall that in the word of mouth communication model we showed that IMRD and
DMRD obtain depending on whether the costs of advertising are large or small. Thus
optimal strategy will increase with increase in social interaction if costs are high but
fall if they are low. The value of the result lies in identifying a simple property of
the returns function as being key to understanding how the level of social interaction
affects optimal strategy. So as an example, consider the seeding the network model.
For the case of equal samples k, the marginal returns are increasing in degree, i.e.,
IMRD obtains. The above result then immediately implies that optimal seeding
increases with social interaction.20
We now turn to the effects of increasing social interaction on the profits of playerM.
The following result shows that the effects of a first order stochastic shift in social
interaction depend on whether the function φ is increasing or decreasing in degree.
20Specifically, it is easy to check that the optimal strategy of the monopolist is given by x∗ =
k/(k + 1), which is increasing in k.
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Proposition 3.6 Suppose the payoffs are given by (1) and P ′ FOSD P .
1. If φk(x) ≥ φk−1(x), ∀x ∈ (0, 1), ∀k ∈ O, then Π(x∗P ′|P ′) ≥ Π(x∗P |P );
2. If φk(x) ≤ φk−1(x), ∀x ∈ (0, 1), ∀k ∈ O, then Π(x∗P ′|P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P |P ).
Proof: Start with some x∗P ∈ (0, 1). In case 1,
Π(x∗P |P ) ≤ Π(x∗P |P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P ′|P ′),
where the first inequality follows because φk(·) is increasing in k and P ′ FOSD P ,
while the second inequality follows from the optimality of x∗P ′ , under P
′. The proof
for the second case follows from analogous arguments and is omitted. 
We have already seen that in the word of mouth communication model the payoff
is increasing in degree. Proposition 3.6 then implies that profits increase with social
interaction. By contrast, in the seeding network model returns are decreasing in
degree, and so Proposition 3.6 immediately implies that profits are falling in the level
of social interaction! This result is relatively easy to obtain in our framework, but it
is worth emphasizing its substantive interest: an increase in social interaction is not
always beneficial for the outside player. The impact on payoffs depend very much on
the content of the social interaction.
We next turn to the effects of an increase in dispersion of social interaction. An
examination of the first order condition, (3), suggests that the effect of such changes
depend on the curvature of the marginal returns with respect to k.
Proposition 3.7 Suppose the payoffs are given by (1), satisfy (R.1) and (C.1), and
that P ′ is a mean preserving spread of P . If the marginal returns are concave (convex)
in k then x∗P ′ ≤ x∗P (x∗P ≥ x∗P ′).
Proof: Let us start with x∗P ∈ (0, 1). Since P ′ is a mean preserving spread of P and
since the marginal returns are concave in degree, it follows that
∂Π(x∗P |P ′)
∂x
≤
∑
k∈O
P (k)
∂φk(x
∗
P )
∂x
− ∂C(α, x
∗
P )
∂x
=
∂Π(x∗P |P )
∂x
= 0.
Next note that (R.1) and (C.1) together imply that expected payoffs are strictly
concave in x for every x ∈ (0, 1). This in turn implies x∗P ′ ≤ x∗P . The proof for the
case where marginal returns are convex in k follows from analogous arguments and
is omitted.

Remark 2: It is easy to see that this result can be strengthened and holds so long
as concavity (convexity) of the marginal returns holds at the optimum x∗P .
We now ask how profits of the monopolist vary with a mean preserving spread in
social interaction.
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Proposition 3.8 Suppose payoffs are given by (1) and that P ′ is a mean preserving
spread of P .
1. If φk(x) is concave in k, for all k ∈ O, then Π(x∗P ′|P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P |P ).
2. If φk(x) is convex in k for all k ∈ O, then Π(x∗P ′|P ′) ≥ Π(x∗P |P ).
Proof: We prove 1.
Π(x∗P ′|P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P ′|P ) ≤ Π(x∗P |P )
where the first inequality follows because φk(.) is concave in k and P
′ is a mean
preserving spread of P , while the second inequality follows by optimality of x∗P , under
P . The proof for case 2 is analogous and is omitted. 
Recall that in the word of mouth communication model payoffs are concave in degrees,
and so Proposition 3.8 implies that profits are falling with greater dispersion in social
interaction. By contrast, in the seeding the network model payoffs are convex in
k; Proposition 3.8 then tells us that profits are increasing with dispersion in social
interaction. Thus the implications of increasing dispersion in profits goes in opposite
directions in the two models. These differences reiterate the point we made above: the
impact of changes in the dispersion of social interaction on firm’s profits is sensitive
to the content of social interaction.
4 Extensions
In this section we present two extensions. The first extends the benchmark model to a
setting in which player M has additional information on the distribution of personal
connections. The second extension studies optimal advertising when some individuals
in group N are drawn more than others. These individuals are the opinion leaders
or influencers.
4.1 Targeted Strategies
We now consider a situation in which the player M knows the degree of each indi-
vidual, and is therefore able to target her effort.21 We would like to understand the
circumstances under which M should target the high or the low degree individuals.
21There are some well known examples in which organizations have tried to target key individuals
in a social context to generate desirable outcomes. For instance, in 2001 the firm Hasbro, a worldwide
leader in manufacture and marketing of games and toy, collected data on the social network of boys
aged eight to thirteen in Chicago. This data was used to identify 1600 influential children who were
then the focus of personal advertising and training. For further details on this case, see Tierney
(2001). See Rosen (2000) for detailed discussions on a variety of similar case studies.
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We also examine the relative value of using a targeted strategy as compared to an
un-targeted strategy and how this relates to the nature of social interaction.22
Formally, the monopolist knows the distribution of degrees P and is able to partition
the set N in k¯ groups. P (k) is the fraction of individuals in group k and individuals
in group k have degree k. Hence, the strategy of the monopolist is a vector x =
(x1, ..., xk¯), where xk ∈ [0, 1] indicates the effort that playerM targets to group k ∈ O.
It follows that x ∈ [0, 1]k¯. A strategy x generates a total effort θ(x) =∑k∈O P (k)xk.
We will consider models in which expected returns from a k degree individual can
be represented as φk(xk, θ(x)). The expected net profits to the monopolist from a
strategy x are:
Π(x|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)φk(xk, θ(x))− C(α, θ(x)) (4)
We now discuss our two examples, word of mouth communication and seeding the
network, in a context where M knows the degree of every individual.
Example 4.1 Word of mouth communication, continued
Given x the expected returns from a k degree consumer are:
φk(xk, θ(x)) = 1− (1− xk)(1− θ(x))k,
which is the probability that an individual with degree k will be informed either from
direct advertisements or from word of mouth communication.23 Note that φk(xk, θ(x))
is concave in the first argument. The expected profits of the monopolist are,
Π(x|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)[1− (1− xk)(1− θ(x))k]− α
2
(θ(x))2.

Example 4.2 Seeding the network, continued.
In this case the expected returns from an k degree individual are:
φk(xk, θ(x)) = (1− xk)(θ(x))k.
22The massive quantities of data available on social networks, such as chat rooms, social networking
web-sites, newsgroups, has led to a booming literature on social network data mining in computer
science. Its main objective is to construct algorithms which allow to analyse social network data in
order to determine measures of what is called the network value of customers: the expected increase
in sales to others that results from marketing to that customer. Not surprisingly, the degree of a
node is an important determinant of the network value of a consumer. See Domingos and Richardson
(2001), Kempe et al (2003).
23Note that here we are assuming that consumers sample other consumers randomly from N .
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This is the probability that an individual with degree k will buy the product in period
2. It may be checked that φk(xk, θ(x)) is concave in the first argument. The expected
profits of player M under strategy x are
Π(x|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)(1− xk)(θ(x))k

We say that a strategy x is monotonically increasing in degree if xk+1 ≥ xk for all
k ∈ O \ {k¯}. A monotonically decreasing strategy in degree is defined similarly. We
now develop simple conditions on the returns function φk(·, ·) under which the optimal
strategy is monotonically increasing and decreasing in degree, respectively.
Definition 4.1 The returns function φk(xk, θ(x)) exhibits IMRD if for all x > x
′
and k < k¯, φk+1(x, θ(x)) − φk+1(x′, θ(x)) ≥ φk(x, θ(x)) − φk(x′, θ(x)). Analogously,
the monopolist faces decreasing marginal returns in degree (DMRD) if for all x > x
′
and k < k¯, φk+1(x, θ(x))− φk+1(x′, θ(x)) ≤ φk(x, θ(x))− φk(x′, θ(x)).
The following result can now be stated.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose the payoffs are given by (4). In addition suppose that the
returns function φ(·, ·) satisfies concavity in its first argument, and that P (k) > 0 for
all k ∈ O.
1. If the returns function φk(., .) satisfies IMRD then the optimal targeted strategy
is monotonically increasing in k.
2. If the returns function φk(., .) satisfies DMRD then the optimal targeted strategy
is monotonically decreasing in k.
Proof: We prove part 1. Note that for all s ∈ O we have that
dΠ(x|P )
dxs
= P (s)
[
∂φs(xs, θ(x))
∂xs
+
∑
k∈O
P (k)
∂φk(xk, θ(x))
∂θ(x)
− ∂C(α, θ(x))
∂θ
]
Within the brackets only the first term differs across the s. Let x∗ be the optimal
targeted strategy. Suppose there is some s and some x∗s > 0 such that
dΠ(x∗|P )
dxs
≥ 0.
It then follows from IMRD that the total derivative will be positive at xs′ = xs for all
s′ ≥ s. The result then follows from concavity of the payoff function with respect to
its first argument xs for each s. We note that if there is no s with this property then
clearly the result is true. The proof for the DMRD case is analogous and omitted. 
The two conditions on payoffs in Proposition 4.1 are interesting as they are simple to
check and they are satisfied by our two examples. In particular, the word of mouth
17
example satisfies DMRD while the seeding the network satisfies IMRD. In fact the
implications of IMRD and DMRD are a little stronger in these examples, and yield
cut-off optimal strategies.
An increasing cut-off strategy x has a k˜ ∈ O such that xk˜ ∈ [0, 1], while for all k > k˜,
xk = 1 and for all k < k˜, xk = 0. A decreasing cut-off strategy is defined similarly.
The following result covers the two examples.
Corollary 4.1 In the word of mouth communication example the optimal targeted
strategy is a decreasing cut-off strategy, while in the seeding the network the optimal
targeted strategy is an increasing cut-off strategy.
Proof: We prove this result for the word of mouth communication model. Similar
arguments can be used to prove the result for the seeding the network model. First
note that the function φk(·, ·) in the word of mouth communication example satisfies
DMRD and it is concave in its first argument. So, we can apply Proposition 4.1 to
infer that an optimal strategy is monotonically decreasing in degree. Second, the
marginal returns for a degree s individual are:
dΠ(x|P )
dxs
= P (s)
[
(1− θ(x))s +
∑
k∈O
P (k)k(1− xk)(1− θ(x))k−1 − αθ(x)
]
Suppose x∗ is optimal and that 1 > x∗s′ ≥ x∗s > 0, for some s′ < s. Since x∗s > 0,
it follows that dΠ(x
∗|P )
dxs
≥ 0. However, from DMRD and the fact that the first term
(1− θ(x∗)) only depends on θ(x∗), it follows that dΠ(x∗|P )
dxs′
> 0. So aggregate payoffs
can be strictly increased relative to x∗. This contradicts the hypothesis that x∗ is
optimal, and concludes the argument. 
Corollary 4.1 tells us that when the content of social interaction is about information
sharing, the optimal strategy involves targeting the low degree consumers, as they are
less likely to be informed by their cohort. In contrast, in the adoption externalities
example, high degree consumers are the natural target, as they are unlikely to buy
the product via social influence and so the marginal cost of sending them free samples
is smaller. Hence, the structure of optimal targeted strategies is inherently linked to
the content of social interaction.
We next examine how the value of using targeted strategies as against un-targeted
strategies depends on social interaction. We will focus on the word of mouth com-
munication example, hereafter. We start with a simple remark.
Let ∆P = Π(x
∗|P ) − Π(x∗|P ), where Π(x∗|P ) and Π(x∗|P ) indicate the maximum
profits under targeted and un-targeted strategies, respectively.
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Proposition 4.2 Consider the word of mouth communication example and fix some
P (·). If P (·) assigns positive probability to two or more degrees in O, then ∆P > 0.
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is provided in the appendix. Proposition 4.2 shows that
targeted strategies strictly increase firm’s profits relative to un-targeted strategies.
This result obtains whenever P assigns positive probability to two or more degrees;
for otherwise, there is not difference between a targeted and an un-targeted strat-
egy. More generally, this suggests that a greater dispersion in the distribution of
connections favors the use of targeted strategies. This is addressed in our next result.
Proposition 4.3 Consider the word of mouth communication with targeted strate-
gies. If P ′ is a mean preserving spread of P , then there exists a α∗ > 0 such that for
all α < α∗, profits under P ′ are (weakly) higher than profits under P and ∆P ′ > ∆P .
Proof. Suppose that P ′ is a mean preserving spread of P . We first show that this
implies that there exists a k∗ ∈ O \ {1, k¯} such that P ′(s) ≤ P(s) for all s ≥ k∗.
Suppose not; then there must exist k∗ ∈ O \ {1, k¯} such that P ′(s) ≥ P(s) for
all s ≥ k∗ and the inequality holds strictly for some of these values of s. We now
show that this contradicts that P ′ is a MPS of P . Note that since P ′ is MPS of
P , then
∑k¯
s=1 [P ′(s)− P(s)] =
∑k∗−1
s=1 [P ′(s)− P(s)] +
∑k¯
s=k∗ [P ′(s)− P(s)] = 0.
But since P ′(s) ≥ P(s) for all s ≥ k∗ and the inequality holds strictly for some of
these values of s it follows that
∑k¯
s=k∗ [P ′(s)− P(s)] > 0, which then implies that∑k∗−1
s=1 [P ′(s)− P(s)] < 0, which contradicts that P ′ is a MPS of P . This proves the
claim.
Next, let x∗ be the optimal targeted strategy under P and let k˜ be the cut-off of this
strategy. Lemma 6.1 implies that θ(x∗) ∈ (0, 1) for every α and that there exists a
α∗ > 0 such that if α < α∗ then k˜ > k∗. Suppose then that α < α∗. Next, under
P ′ construct a targeted strategy, x′, such that
∑
k∈O P
′(k)x′k = θ(x
∗). Let k˜′ be the
cut-off under x′. Since k˜ > k∗ and since P ′ is a mean preserving spread of P it follows
that either k˜′ > k˜ or k˜′ = k˜ and x∗
k˜
< x′
k˜′ .
Now note that Π(x′|P ′)− Π(x∗|P ) ≥ 0 if and only if the following condition holds:∑
k∈O
P ′(k)
(1− x′k)
1− θ(x∗) [1− θ(x
∗)]k ≤
∑
k∈O
P (k)
(1− xk)
1− θ(x∗) [1− θ(x
∗)]k. (5)
To show that this holds, define for each k ∈ O, g(k) = P (k)(1−xk)
1−θ(x∗) and g
′(k) =
P ′(k)(1−x′k)
1−θ(x∗) ; by construction, g and g
′ are two probability distributions. Note that
for condition 5 to hold it is sufficient that g′ first order stochastic dominates g, which
is true if and only if,
s∑
k=1
P ′(k)(1− x′k) ≤
s∑
k=1
P (k)(1− xk). (6)
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Note that for all s < k˜′ the LHS of that inequality is equal to zero, while the RHS
is non-negative, so the inequality is clearly satisfied. For s ≥ k˜′, ∑sk=1 P ′(k)x′k =
θ(x∗) =
∑s
k=1 P (k)x
∗
k. Thus, for all s ≥ k˜′, condition (6) holds if and only if P ′(s) ≤
P(s), which follows by the hypothesis that P ′ is a mean preserving spread of P
together with the fact that k∗ < k˜. Since g′ FOSD g and since (1 − θ(x∗))k is
strictly falling in k, the claim follows. Since Π(x′|P ′) ≥ Π(x∗|P ) it follows that the
monopolist will obtain (weakly) higher profits with the optimal strategy under P ′
as well. Finally, since under un-targeted strategies optimal profits fall with mean
preserving shifts (c.f. Proposition 3.4) it immediately follows that ∆P ′ > ∆P . This
concludes the proof.
We now elaborate on why greater dispersion in connections has contrasting effects on
profits under targeted and un-targeted strategies.24 A mean preserving spread shift
augments the fraction of consumers with low degree, while it increases the fraction
of consumers with high degree. Under un-targeted strategies the first effect decreases
profits, while the latter increases profits. Since marginal returns are decreasing in
degree, the former effect dominates and consequently profits go down. In contrast,
under targeted strategies the monopolist informs most of the low degree consumers
and this alleviates the negative effect induced by the increase of dispersion in connec-
tions. Specifically, if the monopolist targets sufficiently enough low degree consumers,
which will be the case when advertising is relatively inexpensive, greater dispersion
increases profits.
Indeed, the result in Proposition 4.3 is tight in the sense that if the costs of advertising
are sufficiently high it is easy to construct examples where mean preserving shifts
in degree distributions decrease the profits under targeted strategies as well as the
relative value of targeting. To see this suppose that α = 100, and that P (1) = P (3) =
β and P (2) = 1− 2β, β ∈ [0, 0.5]. Note that an increase in β is equivalent to a mean
preserving spread shifts in degree distribution. Figure 2 plots the relative value of
targeting, Π(x∗|β)− Π(x∗|β), for different values of β. As said, in contrast with the
case of low advertising costs, when costs of advertising are high, the value of targeting
may be lower in more dispersed networks.
4.2 Influencers
We have so far studied a setting in which heterogeneity in social interaction is re-
flected in the idea that some individuals are more susceptible to social influence as
compared to others. In the marketing and social communication literatures a great
24To fix ideas, suppose that α = 1 and consider a shift from a distribution in which all individuals
have degree 2 to a new distribution in which individuals have either degree 1 or degree 3 with equal
probability. Such a shift increases the value of targeting from zero to 10%.
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deal of attention has focussed on opinion leaders or influencers.25 In our setting a
natural way to model influencers is to suppose that some individuals are sampled
more often as compared to others. In this section, we will study a model in which
every individual draws a sample of the same size, but some individuals are drawn
more than others.26 We will first study the case of un-targeted strategies and then
turn to targeted strategies. The discussion will be carried out within the framework
of the word of mouth communication example.
Let I = {1, ..., l¯} and let H : O → [0, 1], be a probability distribution, where H(l)
indicates the fraction of individuals inN who are sampled by l others. The mean of H
will be denoted by lˆ =
∑
l∈I H(l)l. If an individual is sampled by l other individuals
this means that there are l “links” pointing to individual i. We will refer to this as
the in-degree and, in this framework, it represents how much individual i influences
others.
We note that P and H satisfy the condition lˆ = kˆ. For simplicity we focus on the
case where P (kˆ) = 1, in other words everyone draws a sample of the same size.
Example 4.3 Word of mouth communication, continued
For a given untargeted strategy x ∈ [0, 1], the expected net profits of the monopolist
are:
Π(x|P ) = [1− (1− x)kˆ+1]− α
2
x2, (7)
An inspection of the payoffs above reveals that when comparing two distributions
H and H ′ the only factor that matters is the average in-degree. For example if H ′
first order stochastic dominates H, then lˆ′ = kˆ′ ≥ lˆ = kˆ. This immediately implies
from equation (7) that in the word of mouth communication example profits under
H ′ are higher than profits under H. This finding is consistent with Proposition 3.6.
25Generally speaking, influencers may be said to be the people that friends, family and acquain-
tances turn to for information about what to buy, what to read, how to invest and how to vote.
The ideas of influencers, opinion leaders and mavens figure prominently in the popular press. For
instance, in a survey taken in the year 2003, the newspaper Washington Post reported that influ-
encers constitute only 10% of the population and that they shape the attitudes and behavior of the
other 90%. The classic work on opinion leaders is Katz and Lazersfeld (1955); see also Rogers (2003)
and Kotler and Armstrong (2004) for a general discussion on the importance of opinion leaders and
influencers.
26A major issue in the design of peer-leader network intervention policies is to identify the influ-
encers. A general practice is to submit questionnaires to members of the targeted group. Subjects
are asked, among other things, to answer questions about their social network such as to nominate
their best friends, to nominate other individuals with whom they talk about specific issues, etc.
Individuals who receive more nominations from others are identified as network leaders. In turn,
network leaders are asked to attend training section and then they are asked to spread what they
have learnt to their acquaintances. See Kelly et al.(1991) and Valente et al. (2003) for a detailed
discussion of the implementation of these policies.
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We next observe that since only the average in-degree is relevant, a mean preserving
spread in the in-degree distribution H has no effect on profits; this finding is in sharp
contrast to Proposition 3.8. Recall that in the basic model, greater dispersion in
social interaction lowers profits in the word of mouth communication example!
We conclude by studying the optimal targeted strategy in this setting. Let a targeted
strategy be denoted by x = {x1, x2, ..., xl¯}, where xl is the effort that the monopolist
targets to consumers that are sampled by l other consumers.
Let us denote by H˜(l), the probability that a consumer i samples a consumer who
has in-degree l. Using Bayes’ rule, we can express H˜(l) as follows
H˜(l) =
H(l)l
lˆ
.
The following result characterizes the optimal strategy of M when she can target
consumers with different in-degree.
Proposition 4.4 In the word of mouth communication model with in-degree hetero-
geneity, the optimal targeted strategy is an increasing cut-off strategy.
Proof: Given a targeted strategy x, let ω(x) =
∑
l∈I H˜(l)xl. The expected net
payoffs to the monopolist from strategy x are:
Π(x|H) = 1−
∑
l∈I
H(l)(1− xl)(1− ω(x))lˆ − α
2
(θ(x))2,
and for any s ∈ I we have that
dΠ(x|H)
dxs
= H(s)
[
(1− ω(x))lˆ + s
∑
l∈I
H(l)(1− xl)(1− ω(x))lˆ−1 − αθ(x)
]
.
Notice that within the brackets only the second term differs across the different in-
degree consumers. In particular the second term is increasing in the in-degree of
the consumer. Now consider the case that there is some s and some xs > 0 such
that dΠ(x,|H)
dxs
≥ 0. It then follows directly from the above observation that the total
derivative will be strictly positive at xs′ = xs for all s
′ ≥ s, and therefore xs′ = 1. 
In this example note that, by assumption, the size of the sample that each consumer
draws is the same, and so the probability that a consumer is informed by word of
mouth communication is constant across consumers. Hence, more influential con-
sumers are the natural target for the monopolist. More generally, one could allow
that consumers are heterogeneous in their susceptibility to social influence as well as
their degree of influencing others. Our findings point out that these two dimensions
might have different implications for the design of effective strategies.
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5 Conclusion
A broad range of work in economics, as well as in other disciplines, such as marketing
and social psychology, suggests that friends, neighbors and acquaintances, play an
important role is shaping individual behavior. In recent years, firms, governments
and political parties have increasingly tried to incorporate such social effects in the
design of their marketing and development strategies. To the best of our knowledge
there is no theoretical model which examines the effects of social influence on the
design of optimal strategies.
The main contribution of the paper has been to introduce a framework within which
this question can be systematically studied. Our analysis brings out three general
points. First, we show that incorporating information on social interaction can have
large effects on the profits of a player. Thus it is important for firms and governments
to take social interaction seriously. Second, we show that an increase in the level and
dispersion of social interaction can increase or decrease the strategy and profits of
the player; the effect depends on the content of the interaction. Therefore players
should pay attention to the type of interaction as well as the level of social interac-
tion in designing their strategies. Third, we show that the dispersion of connections
determines the value of additional information on connections. This means that the
player should be willing to pay more to learn the details of the network in contexts
with greater dispersion in social connections. We have also illustrated the economic
content of these results via a detailed discussion of two economic applications: opti-
mal advertising in the presence of word of mouth communication and optimal seeding
strategies in the presence of adoption externalities.
This paper has focussed on the case in which there is only one player external to
the network. In many situations, it is more natural to consider multiple players.
For example, these players could be firms competing for consumers or developmen-
tal agencies conducting complementary social programmes. The presence of multiple
players introduces a new key element into the problem, namely the nature of payoff
externalities between external players. In the appendix we have discussed the role
of competition in the example of word of mouth communication. For general pre-
liminary results with two or more players, see our companion paper Galeotti and
Goyal (2007). Moreover, the model we study is essentially static. Generally, differ-
ent content of social interaction as well as a different distribution of connections will
lead to different dynamics of diffusion and therefore to different dynamically optimal
diffusion strategies. In on-going work we are exploring the dynamics of diffusion.
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6 Appendix
Proof Proposition 4.2. Start with the optimal untargeted strategy under P , say
x; we know that x ∈ (0, 1). Construct a decreasing cut-off strategy x′, such that
θ(x′) =
∑
k∈O P (k)x
′
k = x. Note that Π(x
′|P )− Π(x|P ) > 0 if and only if∑
k∈O
P (k)(1− x′k)[1− x]k <
∑
k∈O
P (k)(1− x)[1− x]k,
or ∑
k∈O
P (k)
1− x′k
1− x [1− x]
k <
∑
k∈O
P (k)[1− x]k,
Let us define g′(k) = P (k)(1−x
′
k)
1−x , for each k ∈ O. By construction of x′ it follows
that g′ : O → [0, 1] is a probability distribution. Denote by G′(s) = ∑sk=1 g′(k) its
cumulative distribution. It is easy to check that G′(s) ≤ P(s) for all s ∈ O and that
for some s ∈ O the inequality is strict. We use the hypothesis that P assigns positive
probability to two or more degrees to ensure the strict inequality for some s. That
is, g′ FOSD P ; since (1 − x)k is strictly decreasing in k, the claim follows. Since
the monopolist obtains strictly higher profits by using x′, she will also obtain strictly
higher profits under an optimal targeted strategy. This completes the proof. 
Lemma 6.1 Consider the word of mouth communication example with targeted strate-
gies. For every finite α > 0 the optimal strategy x∗P is such that θ(x
∗
P ) ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, if α increases then θ(x∗P ) (weakly) decreases. Finally, if α tends to zero
then θ(x∗P ) tends to one, if α tends to infinity then θ(x
∗
P ) tends to zero.
Proof. Fix α > 0. We first show that θ(x∗P ) ∈ (0, 1). Suppose that θ(x∗P ) = 0,
then x∗s = 0 for all s. However,
dΠ(x∗P |P )
dxs
= P (s)
(
1 + kˆ
)
> 0, for all s ∈ O, and
therefore aggregate profits can be strictly increased relative to x∗P . This contradicts
the hypothesis that x∗P is optimal. Similarly, suppose now that θ(x
∗
P ) = 1, then
x∗s = 1 for all s. Notice that
dΠ(x∗P |P )
dxs
= −P (s)α < 0, for all s ∈ O, which contradicts
the hypothesis that x∗P is optimal.
Next, consider α′ > α > 0 and let x
′
P and xP be the optimal targeted strategies
under α′ and α, respectively. Let k˜ the cut-off under strategy xP . We show that
θ(x′P ) ≤ θ(xP ). Suppose that θ(x′P ) > θ(xP ); this together with the fact that x′P
and xP are decreasing cut-off strategies imply that x
′
k˜
> xk˜. Notice that
dΠ(x|P )
dxs
is
decreasing in α and θ(x) for all s ∈ O and for all θ(x) ∈ (0, 1). This contradicts that
under α′ the optimal targeted strategy is such that x′
k˜
> xk˜. It is easy to verify the
remaining part of the lemma.
Appendix A: Richer Patters of Word of mouth communication.
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An important element in viral marketing is the idea that information can be passed
on from person to person via social connections. However, the model in Section 3
assumes that word of mouth communication decays just after one step. Our model
can be extended in a natural way to cover richer patterns of information diffusion, as
we now illustrate.
For convenience, suppose that every buyer has the same degree, say k, and suppose
that information flows r steps; r ≥ 1 is an integer and it indicates the radius of
information diffusion. For example, r = 2 means that a buyer receives information
from her friends and, indirectly, from the friends of her friends. Given information
radius r and strategy x, it is easy to check that the probability that a consumer with
k friends becomes aware of the product, is φk(x|r) = 1 − (1 − x)
Pr
s=0 k
s
. Hence, the
expected profits to firm M are
Π(x|k, r) = 1− (1− x)
Pr
s=0 k
s − α
2
x2. (8)
It is immediate to check that: (I.) φk(x|r) is increasing and concave in x, in k and
in r, (II.) the function φk(·) exhibits IMRD for low values of x, otherwise it exhibits
DMRD and (III.) ∂
2φk(x,r)
∂x∂r
is positive for low values of x and negative otherwise.
Using properties I-III and the results developed in section 3.1, we immediately obtain
the following results. First, the effects of an increase in the level of word of mouth
communication on optimal advertising strategy and profits presented in Proposition
3.1 and 3.2 extend to richer patterns of information diffusion, i.e. r ≥ 1. Second,
an increase in the radius of information flow is analogous to an increase in the level
of word of mouth communication. Thus, Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 also
address the issue of expanding the radius of information.
Appendix B. Word of mouth communication about product quality
Here we present a model in which there is asymmetric information between firms
and consumers about quality and consumers share their experience about product
quality via word of mouth communication.27 As before, suppose that there is one
firm which is selling to a set of consumers. The set of buyers is N = [0, 1]; each buyer
has inelastic demand and her reservation value for the object is v = 1 if the quality
is HIGH, but the reservation utility v = 0 if the quality is LOW. At the start all
consumers are pessimistic about the quality so that no one is willing to pay a positive
price. Hence, the only way the firm can generate sales is to give away free samples
27In a recent paper, Navarro (2006) also studies the role of word of mouth communication in a
model of asymmetric information about product quality. Her interest is in the affects of word of
mouth communication in mitigating the inefficiencies generated by asymmetric information. She
focuses on the use of prices by firms and free riding in experimentation by firms. By contrast, our
interest is in the impact of word of mouth communication on optimal advertising and the profits of
the firm.
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of the product, and hope that the consumers will pass on good information about
the product. Consider a two period model, where in period 1 the firm chooses the
number of samples to give away for free x ∈ [0, 1], and in period 2 it chooses the price
to charge, p ≥ 0. Moreover, to simplify matters, suppose that there are no direct
costs of producing the good, which implies that the only cost is an indirect one, via
the loss of potential sales. Given that consumers only buy if they are informed that
the product is HIGH, it is optimal for the firm to set price p = 1 in the second period.
We assume this in what follows.
The payoffs to a firm from a consumer with degree k, are then given by
φk(x) = (1− x)[1− (1− x)k].
Notice that (1− x) refers to the probability that a consumers has not been given the
product for free in period 1. It is easy to check that φk(x) is concave in x and it is
increasing and concave in k. These properties correspond to the properties obtained in
the optimal advertising with word of mouth communication about product existence.
For a given distribution, P , we can write the expected profits under strategy x as:
Π(x|P ) = (1− x)
∑
k∈O
P (k)[1− (1− x)k]
The monopolist chooses x to maximize profits. It follows that there is a unique
solution to this optimization problem and that this solution is interior. The effects of
changes in P on the optimal strategy depend on how marginal returns change with
respect to k. It is easy to check that these relations are as in the case when word of
mouth communication is with regard to existence of product. 
Appendix C. Distinction between individual preference heterogeneity and
heterogeneity in social influence.
This section shows how heterogenous social influence is different from a standard
form of individual heterogeneity with regard to willingness to pay. For illustration
suppose there is a unit measure of consumers and that they demand a single unit of a
good; they differ only in their willingness to pay for it. This heterogeneity is reflected
in a distribution P (.), where P (k) is the fraction of consumers who are willing to
pay k for the good. Suppose that the firm knows this distribution and sets a price
p ∈ {1, 2....k¯}. It then follows that the expected profits for the firm with price p and
advertising x ∈ [0, 1] is given by:
Π(x|P ) = p
k¯∑
k=p
P (k)x− C(α, x).
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At an interior optimal x∗, the following must be true:
p
k¯∑
k=p
P (k)− ∂C(α, x
∗)
∂x
= 0.
Now consider a distribution P ′ which first order dominates P . It follows that
k¯∑
k=p
P ′(k) ≥
k¯∑
k=p
P (k) (9)
and if (C.1) holds then the optimal strategy is (weakly) increasing with first order
shifts in willingness to pay. This is in contrast to the result in the word of mouth
communication example; recall from Proposition 3.1 that the effects of increasing
social interaction depend on the costs of advertising. For low costs of advertising
a first order shift in social interaction actually implies a lowering in the level of
advertising. This difference in results arises out of the substitutes relation between
social connections and advertising at low costs of advertising.
Appendix D. Firms’ competition in the presence of word of mouth com-
munication
We now analyse how competition between firms affects advertising strategies and
firms profits in the presence of word of mouth communication. We consider the case
of a duopoly. In this context a strategy profile is s = (xi, xj), xi, xj ∈ [0, 1]. We focus
on symmetric Nash equilibria.28 For a given strategy s, the expected profits to firm
i from a consumer with degree k are:
φk(xi, xj) =
[
1− (1− xi)k+1
] [
(1− xj)k+1 + 1
2
(1− (1− xj)k+1)
]
=
1
2
[
1− (1− xi)k+1
] [
1 + (1− xj)k+1
]
. (10)
A buyer buys the object from firm i whenever she is only aware of firm i or (by
assumption, with 1/2 probability) when she is aware of both firms. The expected
profits to firm i can be then written as follows:
Πi(xi, xj|P ) =
∑
k∈O
P (k)
2
[1− (1− xi)k+1][1 + (1− xj)k+1]− α
2
x2i . (11)
It is easy to check that firms’ advertising intensities are strict strategic substitutes, i.e.
∂2Πi(xi,xj |P )
∂xi,∂xj
< 0, and that the game is of negative externalities, i.e.,
∂Πi(xi,xj |P )
∂xj
< 0.
28For simplicity we are assuming that firms charge a price p = 1, so that firms do not compete in
price. Price competition can be accommodated in our setting in a standard way.
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Furthermore, there exists a unique interior symmetric Nash equilibrium, x∗P , and it
solves:
∂Πi(x
∗
P , x
∗
P |P )
∂xi
=
∑
k∈O
P (k)
2
(k + 1)(1− x∗P )k[1 + (1− x∗P )k+1]− αx∗ = 0. (12)
In what follows we study the effect on equilibrium outcomes of an increase in the level
of word of mouth communication. The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 6.1 Consider two degree distributions P and P
′
and suppose that P ′
FOSD P . There exists α and α¯ such that if α > α¯ then x∗P ′ > x
∗
P , while if α < α
then x∗P ′ < x
∗
P . Furthermore, If α < α then firms’ equilibrium profits are increasing
with the level of word of mouth communication.
Proof. We first prove part I. The derivative of the marginal returns with respect
to degree in a symmetric equilibrium x∗P is:
∂2φk(x
∗
P , x
∗
P )
∂xi∂k
=
(1− x∗P )k
2
[
1 + (1− x∗P )k+1 + (k + 1)
[
1 + 2(1− x∗P )k+1
]
ln(1− x∗P )
]
Note that
∂2φk(x
∗
P ,x
∗
P )
∂xi∂k
> 0 for sufficiently low x∗P , while
∂2φk(x
∗
P ,x
∗
P )
∂xi∂k
< 0 for sufficiently
high x∗P . Next, by inspection of the equilibrium condition 12, it follows that x
∗
P is
decreasing in α, x∗P goes to zero when α→∞, while x∗P goes to 1 when α→ 0. The
proof now follows by using the same arugment adopted in Proposition 3.1.
Finally, to see that if α < α equilibrium profits are increasing in the level of word of
mouth communication note that
Πi(x
∗
P , x
∗
P |P ) < Πi(x∗P , x∗P |P ′) < Πi(x∗P , x∗P ′|P ′) < Πi(x∗P ′ , x∗P ′|P ′),
where the first inequality follows because φk(·, ·) is increasing in k and P ′ FOSD P , the
second inequality follows because x∗P ′ < x
∗
P and the game is of negative externalities,
while the third inequality follows by optimality of firm i.
We first note that the effects of an increase in the level of word of mouth commu-
nication on advertising are similar to the ones we find in the monopoly model (see
Proposition 3.1). Second, when the costs of advertising are sufficiently low, firms’
equilibrium profits are increasing with the level of word of mouth communication.
This is consistent with our findings in the monopoly case (see Proposition 3.2). How-
ever, this does not have to hold for all advertising costs. The reason is that when α
is high, greater word of mouth communication increases the intensities under which
firms advertise. In turn, this effect changes the level of competition between firms
and it may result in lower profits.
We conclude with a result on the effects on advertising and profits of MPS shifts in
degree distributions.
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Proposition 6.2 Suppose P ′ is a MPS of P . There exists α and α¯ such that if
α > α¯ then x∗P ′ < x
∗
P , while if α < α then x
∗
P ′ > x
∗
P . Furthermore, if α < α
then firms’ equilibrium profits are falling with greater dispersion in word of mouth
communication.
Proof. Note that:
∂3φk(x
∗
P , x
∗
P )
∂xi∂k2
= (1−x∗P )k ln(1−x∗P )[2+4(1−x∗P )k+1+(k+1)(1+4(1−x∗P )k+1) ln(1−x∗P )].
It is readily seen that for sufficiently low x∗P the marginal returns are concave in k,
while they are convex for sufficiently large x∗P . The proof follows by replicating the
arguments used in Proposition 3.3.
To show that if α < α then equilibrium profits are falling with MPS shifts, note that,
Π(x∗P ′ , x
∗
P ′|P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P ′ , x∗P ′|P ) ≤ Π(x∗P ′ , x∗P |P ′) ≤ Π(x∗P , x∗P |P ),
where the first inequality follows because P ′ is a MPS of P and the returns from a
buyer with degree k are concave in her degree, the second inequality follows because
x∗P ≤ x∗P ′ and the game is of negative externalities, while the last inequality follows
from optimality.
Appendix E. Seeding the network under different processes of adoption.
This section shows how different assumptions on the process of adoption can be
accommodated in the seeding the network application. Recall that in the general
seeding the network model the probability that a potential buyer eventually adopts
the product is
φk(x) = (1− x)
k∑
s=1
xs(1− x)k−sψ(k, s),
where the function ψ(k, s) indicates the probability that a k-degree consumer adopts
the product in the event that s of her neighbors have already the product. Recall
that ψ(k, 0) = 0 for all k ∈ O.
Different assumptions on the behavior of the probability of adoption with respect to
k and s should be interpreted as indicating different processes of adoption. In what
follows we consider two distinct cases. The first one is suitable for contexts in which
the probability that a consumer adopts the product is only influenced by the absolute
number of her neighbors who have already the product. In contrast, the second case is
suitable in situations in which the probability of adoption depends on the proportion
of consumers’ neighbors who have already the product.
Number of neighbors’ adopters. Suppose that ψ(k, s) = s/k¯, for all s, k ∈ O.
That is, the probability that a consumer adopts the product is increasing in the
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number of her neighbors who have already the product, but it is independent of the
consumer’s neighbor size. Under this assumption, it is easy to very that the expected
returns from a k-degree buyer are:
φk(x) = (1− x)xk
k¯
.
It is easy to see that the optimal seeding strategy is to seed, in period 1, 1/2 of
the consumers, i.e. x = 1/2. Moreover, φk is increasing and linear in k. Therefore,
Proposition 3.6 implies that a FOSD shifts in the degree distribution increases profits.
Finally, profits are not affected by mean preserving shifts.
We now consider the targeted case. For a given x, the expected returns from a
k-degree consumer are
φk(xk, θ(x) =
k
k¯
(1− xk)θ(x).
This function is concave in the first argument and it exhibits DMRD (see defini-
tion 4.1.). Proposition 4.1 immediately implies that the optimal targeted strategy is
monotonically decreasing in k.
Proportion of neighbors’ adopters. Suppose now that ψ(k, s) = s
kβ
, where
β > 1. That is, the probability that a consumer adopts the product depends on the
proportion of individuals in her neighbors who have already adopted the product.
As an illustration, let β = 2 and consider a 2 degree consumer and a 3 degree
consumer. In the event that both consumers observe that two of their neighbors
have the product, then the 2 degree consumer will adopt with probability 1/2, while
the 3 degree consumer will adopt with probability 2/9. It is easy to check that the
returns from a k degree consumer are:
φk(x) = (1− x)xk1−β.
First, the optimal seeding strategy is x = 1/2, and therefore optimal strategies are
not affected by changes in the degree distribution. Second, it is easy to verify that the
expected returns from a k-degree consumers are decreasing and convex in k. Thus,
Proposition 3.6 implies that FOSD shifts in the degree distribution decreases profits,
while Proposition 3.8 implies that MPS shifts in the degree distribution increase
profits.
Finally, suppose the monopolist uses targeted strategies. In this case, for a given
strategy x the returns from a k degree consumer are,
φk(xk, θ(x) = (1− xk)k1−βθ(x).
This function is concave in the first argument and it exhibits IMRD (see definition
4.1.). Thus, Proposition 4.1 implies that the optimal targeted strategy is monotoni-
cally increasing in k.
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Figure 1. Value of incorporating WOM: 
Percentage difference in profits.
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Figure 2. Value of Targeting and MPS shifts: 
Difference in profits.
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